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Grasping 'the imagination' 
In this paper I would like to address a range of questions 
abou! th~ nature and role of the imagination. I would like 
to highlight the thought of philosopher, Charles S. 
Peir~e,. who dev~oped an unusually complete theory of 
senuosIs, reasorung, and the human community. Peirce 
was a leading, if under-appreciated, theorist of the 
human imagination. As Vincent Colapietro has shown 
(1988, 1989), Peirce was a champion of the role of 
unique individual im~tion, while also showing the 
absolute continuity of Individual thought and that of the 
human community. For Peirce, 
[pJeople who build castles in the air do not, for the most 
part, accomplish much, it is true; but every man who 
does accomplish great things is given to building 
elaborate castles in the air and then painfully copying 
them on solid ground. Indeed, the whole business of 
ratiocination, and all that makes us intellectual beings, is 
performed in imagination. (peirce 1931-1958: 6.286)9 
Seen as a type of interior faculty, an aspect of an 
indi~dual person, the imagination is part of his or her 
emotIonal andlor rational capacity. Here, Peirce reiterates 
one of th~ m?st ~su~ co~on-sense. inte9'retations of 
the term I1IIagznatzon, In which something like a detailed 
blueprint is constructed entirely in the mind - a 
coherent, determinate image is constructed through the 
free play of the imagination. But such a view is at odds 
with the ,,:,ay P~ce actually rep!esents im~ation in 
most of his wnttngs on the subject. Peirce denies any 
opposi~on. bet:ween imagin~tion ('fancy" 'musement' etc.) 
and ratIOCInatIon. Reason IS an aspect of imagination 
rather than the other way around, and the two can in no 
way be seen as op~osing forces in human nature. In fact, 
Petrce's departure from standard philosophical common-
sens.e t;Iotions is !D0re radi~ than. this, extending to his 
senuOtIC conc~ptIon of ~e 1m~e Itsel£ If by image one 
means something determmate, like a photograph, Peirce 
?oubted 'whether we ever have any such ~ as an 
Image in our imagination' (ibid., 5.300). Instead, he 
supposed, the imagination is populated with much more 
complex figures, which are far more indeterminate than 
actual images .. The ~n~ral ID:port of a novel, play, 
symphony or Just one s Immediate everyday situation is 
apprehend~d as a complex feeling or emotion, which the 
human nund apprehends as a simpler totalitY: the po~sibility that a series of phenomena are conn;cted. 
Petrce calls such a flash of insight an abduction. 
When a man desires ardently to know the truth his first 
effort will be to imagine what that truth can be [: .. J there 
is~ after ~, ~othing but imagination that can ever supply 
him an inkling of the truth. He can stare stupidly at 
phenomena; but in the absence of imagination they will 
not connect themselves together in any rational way. Just 
as for Peter Bell a cowslip was nothing but a cowslip, so 
for thousands of men a falling apple was nothing but a 
falling apple; and to compare it to the moon would by 
them be deemed 'fanciful'. (ibid., 1.46) 
Because abductions begin as feelings, imagination is 
always embodied: 
The first proper significate effect of a sign is a feeling 
produced by it. There is almost always a feeling which we 
come to interpret as evidence that we comprehend the 
proper effect of the sign, although the foundation of 
truth in this is frequently very slight. This 'emotional 
interpretant,' as I call it, may amount to much more than 
that feeling of recognition; and in some cases, it is the 
only proper significate effect that the sign produces. 
Thus, the performance of a piece of concerted music is 
a sign. It conveys, and is intended to convey, the 
composer's musical ideas; but these usually consist 
merely in a series of feelings. If a sign produces any 
further proper significate effect, it will do so through the 
mediation of the emotional interpretant, and such 
further effect will always involve an effort. I call it the 
energetic interpretant. The effort may be a muscular one, 
as it is in the case of the command to ground arms; but 
it is much more usually an exertion upon the Inner 
World, a mental effort. (ibid., 5.475) 
Imagination is linked to the first stages of a train of 
though~ as a sign of /JOfsibiJity, the vague supposition that 
a certatn state of affairs 111'!) be the case. Peirce often 
~pe~s O! the imaginative state as dream-like; 'a symbol, 
In Itself, IS a mere dream; it does not show what it is 
talking about' (ibid., 4.56), and it will not, until it gains 
some sort of connection - an indexical link - to the rest 
of the universe. 
Imagination is usually associated with images, however 
complex, and with the iconic sign in general. But Peirce 
~so ~ypothesised two other sets of sign-types, that is, 
~~eX1cal and symbolic sign~. An iconic sign is grounded 
It;I lts reslJ1llbJance to ~y pOSSIble object, ~d a purelY iconic 
SIgn resembles only Itself - a pure dream-Image. Indexical 
signs are grounded in their contiguity to their objects - in 
extreme cases, indexes register only an 'outward clash' -
'this ~ect consciou~~ess of hitting and of getting hit 
enters Into all cogrutIon and serves to make it mean 
something real' (ibid., 8.41). Such a collision could not 
happen witho~t .the sym~olic realm. Symbols are signs of 
habIt, prOpenSItIeS to think or act or make connections 






